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The 2010 Bilski decision on business method patents and
intangible methods expressly relies on a trilogy of cases, Benson
(1972), Flook (1978) and Diehr (1981). In light of that reliance, it is
important to review the 1972 Benson decision in its technological,
industrial and legal context. Benson ruled that a presumptively novel
algorithm on number conversion useful for computer programming
was unpatentable. It postulated without analysis or factual support
that algorithms were "ideas." It then ruled that the claims in question
were unpatentable because they covered all practical applications of
the algorithm (idea). This essay shows that Benson was driven not by
any sound policy analysis but rather by an anti-patent bias prevalent
in the 1960s and 1970s and by the interests of the then-dominant
computer hardware company (IBM), which was opposed to the
creation of an independent software industry.
For its core holding in the 2010 Bilski decision on patent eligible
subject matter,' the Supreme Court relies on its own precedent,
primarily a hoary trilogy of cases, 2 Benson (1972),' Flook (1978)4
and Diehr (1981).5 Given that reliance, it is wise to revisit those
cases, especially Benson.
In the trilogy, the 1972 Benson decision is the most significant,
and not merely because it was first. Benson held that claims to a
t Co-Founder, Chisum Patent Academy. Copyright 2010 Donald S. Chisum.
1. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
2. For a plenary discussion of each case, see 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON
PATENTS §§ 1.03[6][c], 1.03[6][e], 1.03[6][g] (2010).
3. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
4. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
5. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
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presumptively novel and useful algorithm, a step-by-step procedure
for converting one form of numbers (binary-coded) into another form
(binary), were unpatentable because the claims preempted an "idea." 6
The Court equated (questionably) an algorithm with an "idea."7 The
Court's opinion suggested, in dictum, that computer programs would
not be patentable unless Congress made an affirmative decision that
they should be.
The two subsequent cases in the trilogy involved a divided Court
extending Benson (in Flook) and then limiting it (in Diehr).
Bilski closely tracks Benson by reasoning that the claims at issue,
which were to a commodities hedging method, were to the "concept
of hedging" and were bad because they "preempted" that concept and
were, therefore, for unpatentable "abstract ideas."9
Benson is a failure.10 The failure is perpetuated in Bilski by
deadlock in the Supreme Court. The persistence of controversy over
the patentability of software for thirty-eight years and the inability of
a majority in the Supreme Court to provide significant guidance on
the patentability of intangible methods verify the weakness of
Benson's reasoning. The vagueness of the reasoning in Benson
temporarily served the interests of those opposed to software
patenting, but in the long run, Benson served no one's interest,
certainly not the public interest. Its ambiguity allowed software patent
proponents to subvert any bar that software patent opponents desired.
The ambiguity also deterred legitimate inventors of software-
implemented inventions from applying for patent protection.
Of importance to understanding Benson is its historical context.
The context has technological, industrial and legal dimensions.
As of 1972, intellectual property protection for computer
software technology was in a state of uncertainty. At the time,
hardware technology, for example, that relating to processors and
memory storage, was progressing down the road of miniaturization
and ever increasing speed." In the 1950s, digital computers were
built using vacuum tubes and took up entire buildings.12 They had
6. Benson, 409 U.S. at 72-73.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3222 (2010).
10. For a detailed critique of the Court's reasoning in Benson, see Donald S. Chisum, The
Patentability ofAlgorithms, 47 U. PITr. L. REv. 959 (1986).
11. See SIVARAMA P. DANDAMUDI, FUNDAMENTALS OF COMPUTER ORGANIZATION AND
DESIGN 31-33 (2003).
12. See generally ALEXIS LEON ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTERS 5.3-5.5 (1999).
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less computing power than a 2010 handheld device such as an
iPhone. 13
During World War II, coordinated research fostered the basic
technologies for programmed digital computing.14 After the War,
large companies in the United States competed for the computing
market, including Sperry Rand, Honeywell, RCA, NCR, Burroughs,
Control Data, GE, Philco-Ford, and IBM.15 This struggle for the
computing market included litigation over patents. A landmark was a
1973 decision on the "Eckert-Mauchly" patent, which was based on
the "ENIAC" (electronic numerical integrator and computer).16 From
this competition, IBM emerged dominant, the dominance stemming
more from IBM's marketing prowess than its technological
achievements. 17
Through the 1960s, programming (software) for the giant
computers was perceived as a service that a computer vendor, such as
IBM, would provide so as to adapt a computer system to a customer's
particular needs. 18 There was essentially no distinct software industry
or market, and it was not in the interest of the vendors that there be
one. 19 A big vendor did not relish being subject to copyright or patent
claims by smaller companies and independent inventors. 2 0 Hence, in
that era, IBM opposed both copyright and patent protection for
software. Subsequently, as its interests changed, IBM changed its
positions. In a dispute with a Japanese rival, Fujitsu, over mainframe
computer operating systems, IBM championed copyright protection
for software in the United States and around the world.2 1 With its
development of the "PC" personal computer, IBM pursued patents on
13. See generally DANDAMUDI, supra note 11, at 31-34.
14. See generally KENNETH FLAMM, CREATING THE COMPUTER: GOVERNMENT,
INDUSTRY, AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY 11-20 (1988).
15. See id. at 101-05.
16. See Honeywell Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 180 U.S.P.Q. 673 (D. Minn. 1973)
(concerning U.S. Patent No. 3,120,606 (filed June 26, 1947)). For a discussion of the Honeywell
litigation, see 6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.07[6][c][i] (2010).
17. See FLAMM, supra note 14, at 103.
18. See generally Thomas Haigh, Software in the 1960s as Concept, Service, and
Product, 24 IEEE ANNALS OF THE HIST. OF COMPUTING 5, 5-13 (2002).
19. See generally id.
20. See Donald R. Dunner et al., Nonstatutory Subject Matter, 14 JURIMETRICS J. 113,
118 (1973).
21. See Anita Stork, The Use of Arbitration in Copyright Disputes: IBM v. Fujitsu, 3
HIGH TECH. L.J. 241, 243, 254, 256-57 (1988) ("IBM did not register copyright protection on its
operating system software until 1978, the year the National Commission on New Technological
Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) recommended that copyright protection be extended to
computer programs.") (internal citations omitted).
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the PC system and successfully licensed them.22
Pre-1972, policy and practice in the Patent Office favored IBM's
no-patents-on-software position.2 3  Supporting the position was a
recommendation in 1966 by a "President's Commission on the Patent
System."2 4
The Benson algorithm patent application arose from the
activities of one of the few large, non-vendor entities doing
independent research that would be applicable to computer
programming: Bell Laboratories of AT&T (American Telephone and
Telegraph, the then telephone monopoly).25  Consistent with its
policy, the Patent Office rejected the application. 26 The rejection of
two claims (Claim 8 and Claim 13) was appealed to the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA).27
Meanwhile, in the 1969 to 1971 time frame, the CCPA had been
moving in a direction opposite that of the Patent Office, issuing
decisions disapproving of non-statutory per se exclusions from
patentability, including the exclusion of claims to "mental steps."28
22. See Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(describing a licensing agreement concerning IBM's "patent portfolio protecting its one-time
dominance in the personal computer market" and noting that, in 1988, "conventional wisdom
instructed that selling IBM clones required a license to IBM's patent portfolio").
23. See In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 686 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (describing the Patent Office's
"blanket policy"), rev'd sub nom. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
24. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF
USEFUL ARTS, REPORT TO THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITrEE, S. DOC. NO. 5, 90th Cong., (1st
Sess. 1967), Recommendation IV.
25. In attempting to patent the Benson-Tabbot algorithm, Bell Labs lost in the Supreme
Court. It had mixed results in its pursuit of patent protection in Europe. See, e g., Patent Act
(PatG), Sec. I - "BCD Conversion," 5 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 211, 211-16
(1974) (summarizing a German Federal Patent Court decision); Birgitt A. Pagenburg,
Patentability of Computer Programs on the National and International Level, 5 INT'L REV.
INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. I (1974); Friedrich-Karl Beier, Future Problems of Patent Law,
3 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 423, 432-36 (1972). Despite Benson, Bell Labs
continued to seek patents on new and useful algorithms. For example, it succeeded in obtaining
a patent on the "Karmarkar" algorithm for solving the notorious "Traveling Salesman Problem."
See U.S. Patent No. 4,744,028 (filed Apr. 19, 1985) (issued May 10, 1988). Bell Lab's patents
devolved to Lucent when AT&T was dismembered for antitrust reasons. Lucent continues to
litigate patents from Bell Lab's research. See, e.g., Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1301, 1308 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
26. See In re Benson, 441 F.2d 670 at 687 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
27. See id.
28. E.g., In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 895 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Mahony, 421 F.2d
742, 745-46, 777 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969); In re Prater,
415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1968), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on reh'g, 415 F.2d 1393
(C.C.P.A. 1969). See also In re McIlroy, 442 F.2d 1397 (C.C.P.A. 1971); In re Foster, 438 F.2d
1011 (C.C.P.A. 1971). This line of cases is discussed in DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON
PATENTS § 1.03[6][b] (2010).
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Consistent with the trend of CCPA decisions, Judge Giles Rich,
in a masterful opinion by that great judge, reversed the Office's
rejections of the Benson-Tabbot claims. 29
Claim 8 was to the algorithm implemented by operation of
"signals" on a "reentrant shift register."30 Thus, it covered "only a
machine-implemented process." Judge Rich rejected the Patent Office
arguments that the claim was not a Section 101 "process" because a
"programmable computer is merely a 'tool of the mind' and the
method's 'workstuff is 'numbers which are mathematical
abstractions."' 3 1 Judge Rich noted: "Cash registers, bookkeeping
machines, and adding machines also work only with numbers but this
has never been considered a ground for taking them out of the
'machine' category of section 101.,,32
Claim 13 did not refer to an apparatus.33 Judge Rich read the
claim as encompassing, at least "in theory," the carrying out of the
BCD conversion algorithm with "any kind of writing implement and
any kind of recording medium." 34 This gave some credence to the
Patent Office argument that the claimed method was "basically
'mental' in character." Judge Rich gave, essentially, two responses.
First, even when carried out manually by an operator (or by a law
professor in a patent law class!), the claimed method required no
"exercise of judgment" or "decision as between alternatives."3 An
operator must "think ... only to the extent necessary to assure that he
is doing what the claim tells him to do."36 Second, the Claim 13
method had "no practical use other than the more effective
operation ... of a ... digital computer."3 7 This placed the claimed
method squarely within "the technological or useful arts."38
In Benson, the government sought certiorari review, which the
Supreme Court granted. At that time, there was an intellectual
property section in the Antitrust Division of the United States
Department of Justice. The section's chief, Richard H. Stern, was
instrumental in the decision to seek review of the "pro-patent" Benson
29. See In re Benson, 441 F.2d 670 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
30. Id. at 683.
31. Id. at 687.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 683.
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decision. He leveraged his unique credentials-a degree in electrical
engineering and service as the first law clerk to Supreme Court
Justice White-to promote the Court's review.
In Benson, as in Bilski, there were multiple amici curiae.
Consistent with their positions, as described above, the computer
hardware vendors (Burroughs, Honeywell and IBM) opposed the
CCPA decision and urged reversal. Supporters of the pro-patent
position included organizations of patent attorneys, such as the
American Patent Law Association, and, interestingly enough, Mobil
Oil Corp.
The Supreme Court truncated itself to six voting Justices. Three
Justices (Stewart, Blackmun and Powell) recused themselves.
Typically, no reason is given for a Justice's recusal, but one can
speculate: at the time, the stock of AT&T, the owner of Bell Labs and
hence of the Benson application, was regarded as the ultimately safe
investment and it was widely held in personal and family portfolios.
One can also wonder whether the participation of three more justices
might have improved the quality of the reasoning in Benson.
In 1972, an interested observer of the patent system, awaiting the
result in Benson, would not have had immediate electronic access to
the opinion, as is now true with Supreme Court opinions, which are
virtually instantly available through Internet blogs, such as
"SCOTUS." The blogs allowed us to begin shaking our heads about
the Bilski opinions only minutes after 10:00AM on June 28, 2010. But
even without instant access to Benson, an interested observer would
have been immediately concerned by the announcement of the
opinion for at least two reasons. First, the opinion came down on
November 20, 1972, only a month after argument (October 16, 1972),
hardly long enough for a thoughtful deliberation (and in contrast to
Bilski, which took over six months to emerge after oral argument on
November 9, 2009). Second, and more importantly, the author of the
opinion was Justice William 0. Douglas. Justice Douglas was
notoriously hostile toward the patent system. That Justice Douglas
was unreasonably biased against patents is supported by the fact that
two provisions of the 1952 Patent Act were intended to correct
hyperbolic statements in Douglas' opinions.3 9
39. Section 103 provides: "Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which
the invention was made." 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2004). This was in response to Justice Douglas'
statement in Cuno Eng'r. Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 90-92 (1941), that to
be patentable, a useful new device "must reveal the flash of creative genius." See 2 DONALD S.
CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5.04[2]. Section 271(d) limits the misuse doctrine. 35 U.S.C. §
271(d) (2010). This was in response to Justice Douglas' opinion in Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-
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Justice Douglas' Benson opinion begins with a clear and
accurate description of the Benson-Tabbot application and claims. 40
One suspects the description was written by a law clerk, not the
Justice.
After the description, the opinion quotes a number of Supreme
Court decisions. 4 1 The opinion glues together words and phrases from
those decisions in positively misleading ways to reach propositions
that are not supported by the decisions' actual facts and holdings.
Consider the oft-quoted sentence from Benson:
Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes,
and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the
basic tools of scientific and technological work. 42
How did the Court derive this supposedly well-established triple
exclusion? First, the "phenomena of nature" exclusion comes from
decisions such as the 1948 Funk case. But the Court makes no
attempt to explain how a natural phenomenon exclusion relates to the
algorithm claims in question. If a newly created algorithm is a
"phenomenon of nature," so must be all human inventive activity.
That cannot be true. Humans are indeed "part of nature," but there
could be no patent system if all human inventions are phenomena of
nature.
Second, the Court refers to "mental processes" as unpatentable
but cites no authority, even though there was extensive prior case law
Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944), applying that doctrine so as to severely limit the
remedy for contributory infringement. See Dawson Chem. v. Rohm & Haas, 448 U.S. 176
(1980).
Indicative of Justice Douglas' high standard of patentability is his concurring opinion in
the 1950 A&P decision, the Supreme Court's last before the 1952 Act. Justice Douglas opined
that a patentable invention must be one almost in the running for a Nobel Prize. Said he:
Every patent is the grant of a privilege of exacting tolls from the public. The
Framers plainly did not want those monopolies freely granted. The invention, to
justify a patent, had to serve the ends of science-to push back the frontiers of
chemistry, physics, and the like; to make a distinctive contribution to scientific
knowledge. That is why through the years the opinions of the Court commonly
have taken "inventive genius" as the test.... It is not enough that an article is
new and useful. The Constitution never sanctioned the patenting of gadgets.
Patents serve a higher end-the advancement of science. An invention need not
be as startling as an atomic bomb to be patentable. But it has to be of such quality
and distinction that masters of the scientific field in which it falls will recognize
it as an advance.
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154-55 (1950).
40. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U. S. 64, 64-67 (1972).
41. See id. at 67-71.
42. Id at 67.
43. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
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on the "mental steps doctrine" in the lower courts.
Third, and most distressingly, the Court's exclusion of "abstract
intellectual concepts" stems from an out-of-context combination of
two statements from old cases that did not even involve intangible
processes. The first statement-"an idea of itself is not patentable"-
is from the 1874 Rubber-Tip Pencil decision.4 The second
statement-"a principle, in the abstract" is not patentable-is from
the 1852 Le Roy opinion.45 The tenor of the two cases is, contrary to
the implication of Benson, a positive one: that an "idea" or a
"principle" is patentable when applied to create a novel and useful
process or product even though the idea or principle itself is not
patentable because it is either well known or too abstract. Rubber-Tip
Pencil held that a patent on attaching a rubber eraser to a pencil was
invalid for lack of novelty. 4 6 The Benson-quoted phrase-"An idea of
itself is not patentable"-was meant, in context, to say that a "good
idea" for a product (good from a business or marketing point of view)
did not meet the patentability requirements if the product itself lacked
novelty (or was an obvious modification of the prior art from a
technical point of view).47  Le Roy held that an inventor who
discovered a property of lead-that it would form a perfect bond if
poured under certain pressure and temperature conditions-could not,
based on that discovery, claim old machinery that could be used in
accordance with the discovered property.48
44. Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874).
45. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174 (1852).
46. Rubber-Tip, 87 U.S. at 505-07.
47. See id. at 507. The full context of the "idea-is-not-patentable statement" carries a
different connotation than that created by the quotation in Benson. In Rubber-Tip Pencil, the
Court stated: "An idea of itself is not patentable, but a new device by which it may be made
practically useful is. The idea of this patentee was a good one, but his device to give it effect,
though useful, was not new." Id.
In Rubber-Tip Pencil, the Court spoke in terms of lack of novelty. However, at that time, the
courts did not distinguish between lack of novelty and obviousness as carefully as they do today.
48. Le Roy, 55 U.S. at 174-77. As in the later Rubber-Tip decision, the Court in Le Roy
emphasized that the key for patentable subject matter was useful application as opposed to
abstraction. The Court noted:
The word principle is used by elementary writers on patent subjects, and
sometimes in adjudications of courts, with such a want of precision in its
application, as to mislead. It is admitted, that principle is not patentable. A
principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive;
these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.
Nor can an exclusive right exist to a new power, should one be discovered in
addition to those already known. Through the agency of machinery a new steam
power may be said to have been generated. But no one can appropriate this power
exclusively to himself, under the patent laws. The same may be said of
electricity, and of any other power in nature, which is alike open to all, and may
be applied to useful purposes by the use of machinery.
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Having, supposedly, established that "abstract" ideas are not
patentable, the next logical step would be to explain why the Benson-
Tabbot claims, which are to precise steps for manipulating numbers,
are to abstract ideas rather than to useful processes. On this, the Court
states only that the claimed process is abstract because (1) it is broad,
having both known and unknown uses, and (2) it can "be performed
through any existing machinery or future-devised machinery or
without any apparatus." 49 The problem with the former is that almost
all patents have claimed inventions with at least some unknown uses.
The problem with the latter is that it undermines the very concept of
making processes patentable, as Section 101 clearly does. The Bell
Telephone Patent case,o which the Court discusses two paragraphs
later, involved, precisely, a claim to a process that could be (and was)
performed by "future-devised machinery." 5'
The Court next discusses and quotes, at length, its 19th and 20th
Century decisions on "processes." 52 The Court then cautions that it
was not holding "that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not
meet the requirements of our prior precedents."53 In particular, it
indicates that it is not adopting a "MORT" test, which would require
that "a process patent must either be tied to a particular machine or
apparatus or must operate to change articles or articles or materials to
a 'different state or thing."' 54 In the recent Bilski decision, the Court
confirmed that MORT was not a necessary requirement for a patent
eligible process. 5
In Benson, the Court makes more disclaimers as to what it was
not holding. It does not "preclude[] a patent for any program servicing
In all such cases, the processes used to extract, modify, and concentrate
natural agencies, constitute the invention. The elements of the power exist; the
invention is not in discovering them, but in applying them to useful objects.
Id at 174-75.
49. Benson, 409 U.S. at 68.
50. Dolbearv. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1(1888).
51. Benson, 409 U.S. at 68-69. For a discussion of the historic Bell Telephone Patent
Case, see 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.03[2][c] (2010).
52. Benson, 409 U.S. at 69-71. In the order of their description in Benson, the cases are:
1. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854).
2. Dolbear, 126 U.S.
3. Coming v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252 (1853).
4. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1877).
5. Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1881).
6. Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366 (1909).
7. Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. 1 (1935).
8. Waxham v. Smith, 294 U.S. 20 (1935).
53. Benson, 409 U. S. at 71.
54. Id. at 71-72.
55. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3222 (2010).
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a computer."56 It does not "extend our holding to programs for analog
computers."5 It does not "freeze process patents to old technologies,
leaving no room for the revelations of the new, onrushing
technology."
So, the reader well might have asked the Court at this point:
what are you holding? The Court offers a "nutshell:"
It is conceded that one may not patent an idea. But in practical
effect that would be the result if the formula for converting BCD
numerals to pure binary numerals were patented in this case. The
mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical
application except in connection with a digital computer, which
means that if the judgment below is affirmed, the patent would
wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect
would be a patent on the algorithm itself. 5
There are several flaws in this "nutshell." First, the algorithm at
issue in Benson is not a "mathematical formula," at least not in a
technical sense, and not in the sense in which the Supreme Court had
discussed a "mathematical expression" of a "scientific truth" in the
cited Mackay decision. 6 0 Second, the Court did not explain who
"conceded" that one cannot patent an "idea." Third, the Court
provided no explanation of why a precise step-by-step algorithm is an
"idea," much less an "abstract idea."
In the "nutshell," the Court's reasoning is circular. The
applicants Benson and Tabbot asked for a claim to the algorithm itself
as a new and useful process that did not reflect any natural law or
scientific truth. The Court responded to this question, in effect saying:
the claim to an algorithm cannot be allowed because if it is, the claim
will be to the algorithm. Also, the Court's emphasis on the claim
"preempting" the algorithm is most peculiar in the context of patent
law. Preempting is what patents are all about.
56. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 71-72.
60. MacKay Co. v. Radio Corp., 306 U.S. 86 (1939). MacKay involved a true
"mathematical formula" that bore no relation to the step-by-step algorithm at issue in Benson.
The patent was on a V-type radio antenna system in which the length and angle of the wires was
computed by a variation on a known formula (the Abraham formula). Id. at 91. The Abraham
formula described "the scientific truth that when radio activity is projected from a charged wire
of finite length, i.e., one having standing waves, and having a length of a multiple of half wave
lengths, the angle between the direction of the principal radio activity and the wire is dependent
on wave length and wire length, which is a multiple of half wave lengths." Id at 93-94. The
Court confirmed that "a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of
scientific truth may be" a patentable invention. Id at 94.
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The Court, per Justice Douglas, concluded the short opinion with
a discussion of the then-raging debate on patenting computer
programs. 6 1 It quoted the Presidential Commission recommendation
62
against patenting computer programs. It noted that "extending" the
patent laws to cover "these programs" was a matter not for the courts
but for Congress.
If these programs are to be patentable, . . . considerable problems
are raised which only committees of Congress can manage, for
broad powers of investigation are needed, including hearings
which canvass the wide variety of views which those operating in
this field entertain. The technological problems tendered in the
many briefs before us. .3. indicate to us that considered action by
the Congress is needed.63
Congressional action was not forthcoming. In the thirty-eight
years since Benson, Congress has not directly addressed patent
eligible subject matter.
61. Benson, 409 U.S. at 72-73.
62. Id. at 72.
63. Id. at 73.
2011] 455
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